It is a well-known fact, at least among committees, that the internet is a dangerous place. Not in the charming, early sense of unexpected cat pictures or mildly alarming forums, but in a deeply structural, geopolitical sense involving routers, supply chains, and a growing suspicion that electrons may, in fact, be foreign.
This realization led to a bold and comforting idea: if one could simply ensure that the devices connecting people to the internet were entirely domestic, then the internet itself might become, if not safe, then at least reassuringly local. The logic was elegant. Suspiciously elegant.
Routers, unfortunately, had other plans.
It turned out that routers—small plastic boxes with blinking lights and a tendency to require rebooting at the worst possible moment—were not inclined to respect national borders. They were designed in one country, assembled in another, filled with chips from a third, and occasionally shipped via a fourth that no one could quite locate on a map without assistance. In short, they were the physical embodiment of globalization, which made them deeply inconvenient.
The solution, naturally, was to require routers that were entirely domestic in every conceivable sense: conceived domestically, designed domestically, manufactured domestically, and, ideally, thought about domestically. This would ensure that no foreign influence could possibly creep in, except, of course, for the minor detail that such routers do not currently exist.
This absence was not considered a problem so much as a scheduling issue.
Manufacturers were thus presented with a fascinating opportunity: to produce devices using supply chains that have yet to be invented, with components that are not yet manufactured at scale, under requirements that appear to have been drafted by someone who last encountered electronics in a particularly optimistic brochure.
They responded with a mixture of enthusiasm, confusion, and the quiet sort of existential dread usually reserved for philosophers and IT support staff.
Meanwhile, the justification remained impeccably serious. Routers, it was pointed out, can be hacked. This is true. They can be compromised, recruited into botnets, or persuaded to behave in ways that are deeply unhelpful to their owners. From this, a further conclusion was drawn: that the primary risk factor in cybersecurity is the nationality of the device, rather than its software, configuration, or the general human tendency to use “password123.”
Experts attempted, briefly, to suggest that vulnerabilities tend to arise from bugs, poor maintenance, and the occasional creative disaster in firmware design. This was acknowledged politely and filed under “philosophical considerations.”
The real problem, it seemed, was not insecurity itself, but the unsettling possibility that insecurity might be imported.
And so the quest began: a search for digital sovereignty, defined not as control over systems or resilience against threats, but as the comforting idea that everything involved had been produced within the correct set of borders. It was a vision both ambitious and strangely nostalgic, as if the internet might be persuaded to behave like a loaf of bread—best when locally sourced and slightly suspicious if it has traveled too far.
Reality, as it tends to do, remained awkwardly unconvinced. Supply chains did not rearrange themselves overnight. Chips did not spontaneously relocate. And the global nature of technology continued to persist with the stubbornness of a well-written bug.
Yet the policy stood, serene in its intent, projecting a future in which security could be achieved not through engineering, maintenance, or design, but through geography.
It is, in its way, a magnificent idea.
One might even call it visionary.
Provided, of course, one is willing to overlook the minor detail that it is based on the assumption that something which does not exist can be required into existence by regulation, and that doing so will somehow make the internet safer.
The Guide, which has seen this sort of thing before, offers only a small piece of advice:
If you find yourself attempting to secure a global network by insisting that it become local, it may be worth checking whether you are solving a technical problem—or simply redrawing the map and hoping the electrons will follow.
And so, in a triumph of modern reasoning, humanity finally proved that if reality becomes inconvenient enough, it can simply be declared non-compliant.
This article was created with the assistance of ChatGPT, taking current market developments into consideration. The prompting and supervision of the article were carried out by the author, who considers it to reflect his own opinion.
Michael Martens is CEO of RIEDEL Networks and the author of numerous specialist articles, industry statements, and commentaries in relevant publications. With a clear perspective on technological developments and their impact on business and society, he regularly analyzes current topics and takes a position on key issues related to digital infrastructure.
From time to time, however, he feels the urge to do something different: in those moments, he steps away from traditional professional communication and addresses current market developments in the form of a column or satirical commentary. With subtle irony and a tendency toward sharp observations, he examines industry trends, political decisions, and technological absurdities—always with the aim of providing food for thought and playfully challenging established perspectives.
For these excursions into satirical commentary, he occasionally draws on the support of ChatGPT—always with his own conceptual direction, editorial revision, and clear responsibility for the content.
His contributions deliberately sit at the intersection of expertise and humor, inviting readers to view even complex topics from an unusual perspective.
RIEDEL Networks is a privately owned global network provider specializing in tailormade networking solutions. We are listed in the Gartner Magic Quadrant for Global WAN Services as a niche provider, focusing on mid-sized international companies as well as the media and event sectors. With our own global backbone, we support businesses in staying connected worldwide.
Our services include internet connectivity, MPLS, SD-WAN, SASE, cloud connect, security, and much more. Our customers come from a wide range of industries and value quality, security, and reliability. RIEDEL Networks is a wholly owned subsidiary of the RIEDEL Communications Group in Wuppertal, Germany, and is entirely privately owned by Thomas Riedel.